Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
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Publication:4530915
DOI10.2307/2998576zbMath1015.91010OpenAlexW2016719761MaRDI QIDQ4530915
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2998576
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