Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
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Publication:4530916
DOI10.2307/2998577zbMath1015.91507OpenAlexW3122618161MaRDI QIDQ4530916
Michihiro Kandori, Hitoshi Matsushima
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2998577
communicationfolk theoremimperfect monitoringreview strategydiscounted repeated gamesantitrust lawprivately observed signals
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