Cooperation in Repeated Games When the Number of Stages is not Commonly Known

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00003zbMath1022.91010OpenAlexW2037260400MaRDI QIDQ4530933

Abraham Neyman

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00003

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcommon knowledgefinitely repeated gamesdilemmaprisoners

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

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An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements ⋮ Three steps ahead ⋮ Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games. ⋮ The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end ⋮ The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Uncertainty in the traveler's dilemma ⋮ Repeated games with public uncertain duration process ⋮ Continuous-time stochastic games ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ Privately observed time horizons in repeated games

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