Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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Publication:4530944
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00038zbMath1022.91020OpenAlexW2032206498MaRDI QIDQ4530944
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00038
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