Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00043zbMath1055.91505OpenAlexW2088648609MaRDI QIDQ4530947

Ben Polak

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00043

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (10)

Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences ⋮ Strategic games beyond expected utility ⋮ Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium ⋮ A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies ⋮ FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY ⋮ Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium ⋮ Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality ⋮ Correlated Nash equilibrium ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria

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