Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games
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Publication:4530974
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00125zbMath1022.91014OpenAlexW2055311105MaRDI QIDQ4530974
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00125
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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