Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
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Publication:4530979
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00143zbMath1026.91509OpenAlexW1972967438MaRDI QIDQ4530979
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/24963
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