Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00169zbMath1020.91006OpenAlexW2063446420MaRDI QIDQ4530993

Kalyan Chatterjee, Hamid Sabourian

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00169

zbMATH Keywords

complexityequilibrium selectionbargaininghistory independence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

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