Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00178zbMath1021.91019OpenAlexW1988299172MaRDI QIDQ4530998

Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00178

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsasymptotic efficiencylarge auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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