Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00195zbMath1021.91021OpenAlexW1999981774MaRDI QIDQ4531005

Faruk Gul

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00195

zbMATH Keywords

investmenthold-up problemtwo-person bargaining problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (14)

Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance ⋮ Search equilibrium with unobservable investment ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ The ratchet effect: a learning perspective ⋮ Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales ⋮ Investments as signals of outside options ⋮ Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller ⋮ A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. ⋮ Pre-trade private investments ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency ⋮ The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

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