Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00213zbMath1020.91008OpenAlexW2027764257MaRDI QIDQ4531019

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00213

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaregular valuenormal-form gamegeneric game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity, stability, well-posedness (49K40) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (9)

Structure theorems for game trees ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria. ⋮ Essential equilibria ⋮ On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in bimatrix game forms ⋮ Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Network formation and pairwise stability: a new oddness theorem ⋮ On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

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