Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
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Publication:4531031
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00231zbMath1021.91013OpenAlexW2132632763MaRDI QIDQ4531031
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00231
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