Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
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Publication:4531036
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00246zbMath1041.91006OpenAlexW2095630993MaRDI QIDQ4531036
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=2025&item_no=1&attribute_id=20&file_no=1
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