Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00253zbMath1026.91506OpenAlexW2005409557MaRDI QIDQ4531038

Thomas Römer, Dennis Epple, Holger Sieg

Publication date: 28 May 2002

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00253

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulelocal jurisdictionsTiebout sorting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

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