Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4531057
DOI10.2307/2999574zbMath1015.91515OpenAlexW2115565686MaRDI QIDQ4531057
Jean-Charles Rochet, Philippe Choné
Publication date: 29 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2999574
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Related Items
Optimal interregional redistribution and local budget rules with multidimensional heterogeneity, Screening while controlling an externality, Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach, Adaptive, anisotropic and hierarchical cones of discrete convex functions, Procurement with Cost and Noncost Attributes: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms, Solvability of a class of singular fourth order equations of Monge-Ampère type, Selling two identical objects, Optimal transportation, modelling and numerical simulation, Regularity of the solution to the principal-agent problem, A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments, Mixed bundling auctions, Risk minimization and optimal derivative design in a principal agent game, Efficiency versus optimality in procurement, A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening, Notes on optimal transportation, Existence, uniqueness and efficiency of equilibrium in hedonic markets with multidimensional types, Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information, The monopolist's problem: existence, relaxation, and approximation, Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty, Optimal regional insurance provision: do federal transfers complement local debt?, Method of digraphs for multi-dimensional screening, Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing, Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions, Nonlinear pricing with finite information, Conforming approximation of convex functions with the finite element method, Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity, Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types, Twisted Harnack inequality and approximation of variational problems with a convexity constraint by singular Abreu equations, Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach, Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem, Optimal fund menus, Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations, On the monopolist problem and its dual, Regularity in shape optimization under convexity constraint, Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions, Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms, Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative design, Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines, Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations, Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach, Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics, Version continue de l'algorithme d'Uzawa. (Continuous version of the Uzawa algorithm), COMPUTING THE CONVEX ENVELOPE USING A NONLINEAR PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION, Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources, Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers, Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions, Regularity of solutions for some variational problems subject to a convexity constraint, Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation, Foreword to the special issue devoted to Professor Ivar Ekeland's 70th birthday, On the strategic use of risk and undesirable goods in multidimensional screening, Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication, Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers, Optimal derivatives design for mean-variance agents under adverse selection, On the interaction between asymmetric demand signal and forecast accuracy information, Price experimentation with strategic buyers, Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly, An iterated projection approach to variational problems under generalized convexity constraints, JOB MARKET SIGNALLING WITH TWO DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE INFORMATION, Approximating optimization problems over convex functions, Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency, Pricing lotteries, Optimal taxation in the extensive model, When is multidimensional screening a convex program?, Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions, A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection, Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders, NON-CONVERGENCE RESULT FOR CONFORMAL APPROXIMATION OF VARIATIONAL PROBLEMS SUBJECT TO A CONVEXITY CONSTRAINT, Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition, Free boundaries in optimal transport and Monge-Ampère obstacle problems, Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist, Haggling over substitutes, Learning in nonlinear pricing with unknown utility functions, Inefficiencies on linking decisions, An algorithm for computing solutions of variational problems with global convexity constraints, Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening, House allocation with transfers, On approximating minimizers of convex functionals with a convexity constraint by singular Abreu equations without uniform convexity, A general principal-agent setting with non-differentiable mechanisms: Some examples, Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection, An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing, Global Hölder estimates for 2D linearized Monge-Ampère equations with right-hand side in divergence form, Contracts and productive information gathering, Multitask assignments with adverse selection, Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders, On singular Abreu equations in higher dimensions, Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences, Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements, Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities, Computing prices for target profits in contracts, A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design, A choice-based optimization approach for contracting in supply chains, The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer, Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences, Participation constraints in adverse selection models, The convex envelope is the solution of a nonlinear obstacle problem, A note on wage differentials, fixed-wages and adverse selection., Dangerous tangents: an application of \(\Gamma\)-convergence to the control of dynamical systems, Pessimistic information gathering, The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design, Price discrimination and majority voting, Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
