On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
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Publication:4531544
DOI10.1080/02331930108844574zbMath0996.91084OpenAlexW2089514831MaRDI QIDQ4531544
Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó, Ruth Martínez, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 22 May 2002
Published in: Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143744
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