Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0600-8zbMath1247.91097OpenAlexW2238579971MaRDI QIDQ453204

J. Herrera, D. Rodríguez-Gómez

Publication date: 18 September 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8912/1/dp633.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contract theoryduality of linear programmingfutures marketteam

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach

Cites Work

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