Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
From MaRDI portal
Publication:453204
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0600-8zbMath1247.91097OpenAlexW2238579971MaRDI QIDQ453204
J. Herrera, D. Rodríguez-Gómez
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/8912/1/dp633.pdf
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Conjugate duality of correlated equilibrium
- Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
- The nonatomic assignment model
- Indivisibilities, lotteries, and sunspot equilibria
- Valuation equilibrium with clubs
- A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
- Decentralizing lottery allocations in markets with indivisible commodities
- Subdifferentiability and the duality gap
- Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
- Stability Theorems with Economic Applications
- Clubs and the Market
- Incentives, Contracts, and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms
- Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
This page was built for publication: Futures market: contractual arrangement to restrain moral hazard in teams
