Seller competition by mechanism design
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Publication:453209
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0597-zzbMath1247.91072OpenAlexW2136254210MaRDI QIDQ453209
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0597-z
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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