Relative consumption and majority voting: supplementing Oates' ``decentralization theorem

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0251-7zbMATH Open1247.91064OpenAlexW2028334554MaRDI QIDQ453450

Inga Hillesheim

Publication date: 27 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0251-7

zbMATH Keywords

federalismmedian voterlocal public goodsrelative consumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

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