Inferring beliefs as subjectively imprecise probabilities
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Publication:453645
DOI10.1007/s11238-011-9276-1zbMath1260.91118OpenAlexW1985641170MaRDI QIDQ453645
Arne Risa Hole, Steffen Andersen, John Fountain, Glenn W. Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutström
Publication date: 27 September 2012
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9276-1
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