scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1766750
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Publication:4538166
DOI10.1016/S0453-4514(00)88752-9zbMath1028.91511OpenAlexW4256023581MaRDI QIDQ4538166
Publication date: 11 July 2002
Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0453-4514(00)88752-9
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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