TWO CHARACTERISATIONS OF THE LEXICOGRAPHIC EGALITARIAN SOLUTION
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Publication:4542128
DOI10.1142/S021919890100049XzbMath1014.91004OpenAlexW2122660870WikidataQ128126852 ScholiaQ128126852MaRDI QIDQ4542128
Publication date: 4 September 2002
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890100049x
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Cites Work
- Stability and the Nash solution
- An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives, and solutions to Nash's bargaining problem
- A characterization of the lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for \(n=3\)
- A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem
- The Bargaining Problem
- Stability and Collective Rationality
- Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game