EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION

DOI10.1142/S0219198901000440zbMath1005.91025OpenAlexW2040107151MaRDI QIDQ4542130

Rim Lahmandi-Ayed

Publication date: 1 August 2002

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198901000440

zbMATH Keywords

average cost pricingdynamic entry gamesefficient firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY

Cites Work

• Efficiency of dynamic quantity competition: A remark on Markovian equilibria
• Selection in dynamic entry games
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem

This page was built for publication: EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION