Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation

DOI10.1093/LOGCOM/EXX017zbMath1402.91122arXiv1604.00693OpenAlexW2337518301MaRDI QIDQ4555457

Iyad Rahwan, Edmond Awad, Gabriella Pigozzi, Martin Caminada, Mikołaj Podlaszewski

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Logic and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.00693

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choicepreferencesagentsargumentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Knowledge representation (68T30) Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

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