On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_6zbMath1417.91336OpenAlexW2498031789MaRDI QIDQ4555505

Pierre von Mouche

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_6

zbMATH Keywords

cost functionequilibrium existenceequilibrium uniquenessinterior equilibriumprice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games: very practical conditions

Cites Work

• On organization of markets of homogeneous goods
• Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
• Theories of imperfectly competitive markets
• On the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in case of concave integrated price flexibility
• Cournot games with biconcave demand
• Note on noncooperative convex games
• Uniqueness of Cournot Equilibrium: New Results from Old Methods
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment
• Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets
• ON A LESS KNOWN NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS RESULT
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs