Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_7zbMath1417.91129OpenAlexW2494678484MaRDI QIDQ4555506

Takuya Iimura, Takahiro Watanabe

Publication date: 20 November 2018

Published in: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_7

zbMATH Keywords

payoff functionpure strategy equilibriumreal intervalstrategy profileinverse demand function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• On the existence of Cournot equilibrium without concave profit functions
• A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings
• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• Note on noncooperative convex games
• Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in finite symmetric games where payoff functions are integrally concave
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

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