Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Networks

DOI10.1007/978-981-10-4774-9_4zbMath1402.91172OpenAlexW2399917509MaRDI QIDQ4557874

Benjamin Heymann, Alejandro Jofre

Publication date: 27 November 2018

Published in: Forum for Interdisciplinary Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4774-9_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (1)

Regularized Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints with Application to Energy Markets

Cites Work

• On the existence of supply function equilibria
• Electricity spot market with transmission losses
• Complementarity modeling in energy markets
• Monopolistic competition in electricity networks with resistance losses
• Using EPECs to Model Bilevel Games in Restructured Electricity Markets with Locational Prices
• Finding Supply Function Equilibria with Asymmetric Firms
• Equilibrium Analysis for a Network Market Model
• Optimal Auction Design
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Optimal Offer Construction in Electricity Markets

This page was built for publication: Mechanism Design and Auctions for Electricity Networks