Recurrent crises in global games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.07.003zbMath1260.91151OpenAlexW2027037465MaRDI QIDQ455921

David M. Frankel

Publication date: 22 October 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

shocksmonopolynetwork externalitiesglobal gamesrecurrent crises

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic dynamics (91B55)

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Cites Work

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