Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict
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Publication:456415
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.002zbMath1250.91074OpenAlexW2092148228MaRDI QIDQ456415
Ian A. MacKenzie, Markus Ohndorf
Publication date: 25 October 2012
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.002
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (3)
Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests ⋮ Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers ⋮ The Feasibility of the Double‐Dividend Hypothesis in a Democratic Economy
Cites Work
- Green taxes: refunding rules and lobbying
- Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.
- Pollution taxes and revenue recycling
- Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
- Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation
- Estimates from a consumer demand system: implications for the incidence of environmental taxes
- Citizen participation in pollution permit markets
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