Environmental federalism and environmental liability

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.004zbMath1250.91077OpenAlexW1997977430MaRDI QIDQ456420

Klaas van't Veld, Jason F. Shogren

Publication date: 25 October 2012

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcyenvironmental federalismenvironmental liabilityfinancial responsibilityindustrial accidentsjudgment proof problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some contradictory results
• Strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management: Empirical evidence from accident and spill data
• Direct regulation of a mobile polluting firm.
• Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
• Harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
• On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism
• The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper
• Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments
• Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations

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