Network spot‐checking games: Theory and application to toll enforcing in transportation networks
DOI10.1002/NET.21596zbMath1390.90094OpenAlexW2060778581MaRDI QIDQ4565763
Guillaume Sagnol, Julia Buwaya, Ralf Borndörfer, Elmar Swarat
Publication date: 13 June 2018
Published in: Networks (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/net.21596
Stackelberg equilibriumgame theoryNash equilibriummixed integer programminginspectionsecurity gamesprice of spite
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Linear programming (90C05) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10)
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