A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts

DOI10.1142/S0219198917500323zbMath1391.91117OpenAlexW2773587580MaRDI QIDQ4567818

Nicola Dimitri

Publication date: 20 June 2018

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198917500323

zbMATH Keywords

observabilitycontractsverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Information structures with unawareness
• Agreeing to disagree
• Unawareness and partitional information structures
• Awareness and partitional information structures
• A canonical model for interactive unawareness
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Framing Contingencies
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Courts
• Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

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