Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context
DOI10.1142/S0219198918500019zbMath1391.91023OpenAlexW2766744196MaRDI QIDQ4567821
Evangelos Toumasatos, Stein I. Steinshamn
Publication date: 20 June 2018
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198918500019
game theoryexternalitiescoalition formationBrexitcoalition structure stabilitymackerel disputestraddling fish stock
Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
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- A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES
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