Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule

DOI10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1zbMath1307.91072OpenAlexW2074732065MaRDI QIDQ456955

Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 26 September 2014

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulemultiple electionsArrovian aggregationstable domainstriple-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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