Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
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Publication:4571145
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11zbMath1394.91126OpenAlexW2528947487MaRDI QIDQ4571145
Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Mingyu Guo, Taiki Todo
Publication date: 6 July 2018
Published in: PRIMA 2016: Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_11
Cites Work
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- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Social Decision Functions and the Veto
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
