Revenue Maximizing Markets for Zero-Day Exploits

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_15zbMath1394.91162arXiv2006.14184OpenAlexW2529836358MaRDI QIDQ4571149

Mingyu Guo, Hideaki Hata, Ali Babar

Publication date: 6 July 2018

Published in: PRIMA 2016: Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.14184

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsecurity economicsbug bountyrevenue maximizing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Cooperative facility location games
• Unnamed Item

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