Competitive VCG Redistribution Mechanism for Public Project Problem

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17zbMath1394.91161OpenAlexW2529486671MaRDI QIDQ4571151

Mingyu Guo

Publication date: 6 July 2018

Published in: PRIMA 2016: Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44832-9_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Incentives in Teams
• Undominated Groves Mechanisms
• Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems
• General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics

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