Allocation rules for games with optimistic aspirations

DOI10.1155/2013/540487zbMath1305.91026OpenAlexW3123920445WikidataQ58919854 ScholiaQ58919854MaRDI QIDQ457859

Anne van den Nouweland, Luisa Carpente, Balbina V. Casas Méndez, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/540487

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• The truncated core for games with upper bounds
• Rejoinder on: cooperative games and cost allocation problems
• Coalitional interval games for strategic games in which players cooperate
• A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• The optimistic \(TU\) game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

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