A theory of farsightedness in committee games

DOI10.1155/2014/276489zbMath1305.91055OpenAlexW2088033696WikidataQ59049286 ScholiaQ59049286MaRDI QIDQ457864

Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, Alphonse Fodouop Fotso, Bertrand Tchantcho

Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/276489

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index

Cites Work

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• Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
• On Committee Decision Making: A Game Theoretical Approach
• An Ordinal Bargaining Set for Games Without Side Payments
• Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments

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