Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs

DOI10.1155/2014/631097zbMath1305.91183OpenAlexW2072414879WikidataQ59050397 ScholiaQ59050397MaRDI QIDQ457870

Leonard F. S. Wang

Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/631097

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• COMPETITION AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CASE
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages