Renegotiation perfection in infinite games

DOI10.1155/2014/742508zbMath1305.91037OpenAlexW2048826081WikidataQ59051309 ScholiaQ59051309MaRDI QIDQ457872

Julian C. Jamison

Publication date: 30 September 2014

Published in: Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/742508

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

Cites Work

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