Experts, conflicts of interest, and reputation for ability

DOI10.1111/ijet.12037zbMath1398.91102OpenAlexW3121924248MaRDI QIDQ4584724

Filippo Pavesi, Massimo Scotti

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10453/30219

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissioncheap talkreputationexpertsconflicts of interest

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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