Pricing and investments in matching markets

DOI10.3982/TE1189zbMath1395.91347OpenAlexW3123086201MaRDI QIDQ4585983

Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1189

zbMATH Keywords

matchingsearchdirected searchprematch investmentspremuneration value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (14)

On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Inefficient sorting under output sharing ⋮ Pre-matching gambles ⋮ On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information ⋮ Efficient investments in the implementation problem ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling ⋮ Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers ⋮ Strategic disaggregation in matching markets ⋮ Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities ⋮ Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium ⋮ Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem

Cites Work

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• Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency

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