Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games

DOI10.3982/TE1178zbMath1395.91041OpenAlexW1483388634MaRDI QIDQ4585985

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P. McLean

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1178

zbMATH Keywords

potential gamediscontinuous gametrembling-hand perfect equilibriumstable set equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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