Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange

DOI10.3982/TE1357zbMath1395.91337OpenAlexW2125010663MaRDI QIDQ4585993

Alvin E. Roth, Itai Ashlagi

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1357

zbMATH Keywords

market designkidney exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (16)

On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets ⋮ Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete ⋮ Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange ⋮ On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets ⋮ Ignorance Is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching with Few Queries ⋮ Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game ⋮ Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values ⋮ Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange ⋮ How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange ⋮ Social integration in two-sided matching markets ⋮ IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes ⋮ Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences ⋮ The losses from integration in matching markets can be large ⋮ A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program ⋮ Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange ⋮ Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs

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