Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown

DOI10.3982/TE1439zbMath1395.91283OpenAlexW2133048212MaRDI QIDQ4585994

Boyan Jovanovic, Julien Prat

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1439

zbMATH Keywords

learningprincipal-agent modelprivate informationreputationoptimal contractcareer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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