Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Publication:4586003
DOI10.3982/TE1010zbMath1395.91264OpenAlexW1548481276MaRDI QIDQ4586003
Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Tadashi Hashimoto, Morimitsu Kurino, M. Utku Ünver
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1010
probabilistic serialrandom assignmentsd-efficiencyweak invariancesd-envy-freenessweak truncation robustnessordinal fairness
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