Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis

DOI10.3982/TE1642zbMath1395.91155MaRDI QIDQ4586005

Gabriele Gratton, Laurent Bouton

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingPoisson gamesrunoff elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Related Items (11)

Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ Poisson voting games under proportional rule ⋮ Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule ⋮ The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games ⋮ Strategic stability in Poisson games ⋮ Poisson-Cournot games ⋮ Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection ⋮ Information aggregation with runoff voting ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules ⋮ Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory ⋮ Electoral institutions with impressionable voters

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