Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous

DOI10.3982/TE1335zbMath1395.91338MaRDI QIDQ4586009

Sophie Bade

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

house allocationserial dictatorshipendogenous information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition ⋮ Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

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