A theory of school-choice lotteries
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Publication:4586013
DOI10.3982/TE1558zbMath1395.91345MaRDI QIDQ4586013
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (21)
Efficient lottery design ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing ⋮ Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach ⋮ Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ A note on ex-ante stable lotteries ⋮ Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights ⋮ Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts ⋮ Efficient rules for probabilistic assignment ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
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